We analyze binary choices in a random utility model assuming that agent's preferences are affected by conformism (with respect to the behavior of the society) and coherence (with respect to identity). We show that multiple stationary equilibria may arise and that the outcome looks very different from a society where all the agents take their decisions in isolation. We quantify the fraction of agents that behave coherently. We apply the analysis to sequential voting when voters "like to win". Compared to the present literature, we enrich the setting assuming that each voter is endowed with an ideology and we consider the interplay between coherence and the desire to vote with the (perceived) majority.
Introduction
Economic theory aims to investigate social and economic phenomena referring to agents' choices. To this end an assumption on their preferences is mandatory. The classical hypothesis is that agents' preferences are represented by a utility function defined on consumption goods-e.g. consumer theory, general equilibrium paradigm-or other items related to agent's behavior-e.g. effort, habit, etc.
According to this view, preferences are mostly exogenous and fixed. This approach is flexible enough to model different situations but recently a mounting evidence has shown its intrinsic limits in several fields (economics, sociology, political science, psychology): agent's preferences are also defined on the behavior of other agents, they are not fixed and exogenous, they evolve over time and are influenced by the agent's experience and the choices of the society as a whole, e.g. altruism, interdependent utility, habit formation, network effects, externalities, see Bowles (1998 ), Sobel (2005 , Akerlof and Kranton (2005) .
This evidence leads to go beyond self-interest as the unique motivation of the agents' behavior and the representation of preferences by a utility function of the quantity of the goods consumed by the agent. Preferences may include many different items and the maximization of the utility may produce results far away from the classical pure individualistic behavior. This is the case of choices that have social consequences: any choice has a private value for the agent and a social dimension with externalities on the behavior of the rest of the population. Analyzing social decisions, two features of agents' preferences turn out to be relevant: reputation and identity.
Reputation has been extensively analyzed in the literature. Going back to classical contributions, Veblen (1899) pointed out that economic behavior and preferences are influenced by the behavior of the economy: agents care of their status, they desire prestige and esteem and therefore they are sensitive to social acceptance and reputation which induce them to conformism. In the recent literature this intuition has been modeled in several different perspectives (learning, signaling, technology externalities), and in particular assuming a taste externality (individuals care directly about status, popularity, esteem, respect). Some significant contributions are Akerlof (1980 Akerlof ( , 1997 , Jones (1984) , Bernheim (1994) , Brock and Durlauf (2001) . In all these references, reputation is modeled through a utility function that positively depends on the fact that the agent's behavior agrees with that of the population. Social customs arise from the maximization of the utility because deviation is punished by a loss of reputation. The social interaction outcome may be different from the pure individualistic aggregate behavior.
Pareto (1920) argued that utility is not only driven by tastes but also by identity and norms. The difference is subtle but important: tastes are not necessarily fixed, they may evolve over time but they are usually taken as fixed when the agent takes a decision or an action; norms and identity instead concern a mix of ingredients (social category, status, ideal) and introduce prescriptions on agent's behavior with a feedback effect on the agent's identity and on his utility. We may observe an internalization of rules of behavior representing the identity or the "ego" of the agent. For some attempts to model identity see Stigler and Becker (1977) , Akerlof (1980 Akerlof ( , 2007 , Akerlof and Kranton (2000 , 2005 , 2008 , 2010 , Cont and Löwe (2010) . As observed in
